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ABSTRACT
Little attempt has been made so far to quantify the extent to which individual willingness to spend
on life protection may account for the observed trends and diversities in agespecific life expectancies
across individuals and over time. We address these issues via calibrated simulations of a dynamic,
life-cycle model of life protection in which life’s end is a stochastic event, age-specific mortality
risks are endogenous variables, and spending on life protection is set jointly with related insurance
options: life insurance as well as annuities. A unique feature of our model is that it links age-specific
mortality risks and implicit private values-of-life-saving (VLS) as “dual variables”, and estimates
them jointly. It also offers new insights about the concept and measurement of VLS. Life protection
is estimated to have a non-negligible impact on age-specific life expectancies. It can account for
significant portions of observed inequalities in life expectancies across population groups and over
time, as well as for a wide range of empirical estimates of VLS produced via the conventional
“willingness to pay” approach.
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the persistent upward trend in longevity in the developed world, there has been 
little attempt by economists to quantify the importance of individual efforts at health and 
life  protection  in  explaining  the  trend  and  persistent  disparities  in  age-specific  life 
expectancies  across  population  groups
1.  Studies  that  address  the  determinants  of  life 
expectancy generally rely on life-cycle models treating life’s end as known with certainty 
(see  references  in  Forster,  2000).  Most  also  estimate  reduced-form  equations  of  an 
underlying theoretical structure, which are not derived from the theoretical structure itself 
(see references in Gerdtham et al., 1999, and Barlow and Vissandjee, 1999). Expanding on 
the  approach  developed  in  Ehrlich  (2000),  we  redress  these  issues  through  calibrated 
simulations of a dynamic life-cycle model of life protection where life’s end is an uncertain 
event,  life-cycle  consumption  and  savings  plans  are  influenced  by  related  insurance 
options, and age-specific mortality risks, hence life expectancy, are endogenous variables. 
This enables us to address the demand for life expectancy as a direct choice variable. A 
unique feature of our model is that it links age-specific mortality risks and implicit private 
values-of-life-saving (VLS) as “dual variables”, and estimates them jointly. 
Our key assumption is that age-specific mortality risks can be lowered on the margin 
from biologically endowed levels that continuously rise with age (at least from adulthood), 
through self-protective inputs.  These include preventive medical care services, diet and 
exercise, and myriad safety measures, collectively termed “life protection”. Individuals can 
also insure against mortality risks by purchasing both life insurance and annuities. The 
model’s control variables thus include age-specific consumption and bequest (accumulated 
ordinary  savings  and  life  insurance)  as  independent  choice  variables,  in  addition  to   2 
willingness to spend on life protection. A key co-state variable affecting the latter is the 
‘shadow price of life protection’, also known as the ‘value of life saving’ (VLS). 
As  previous  literature  emphasized  (see  e.g.,  Yaari,  1967,  Thaler  and  Rosen,  1975, 
Davies, 1981, Arthur, 1981, Shephard and Zeckhouser 1982, Philipson and Becker, 1998, 
and  Johansson,  2001),  recognizing  longevity  as  uncertain  can  change  the  standard 
economic predictions about life-cycle choices. We go beyond these models by treating the 
risk of mortality and age-specific VLS as endogenous variables, along with consumption 
and bequest (life insurance as well as annuities). This complex framework does not yield 
explicit solutions for our three endogenous variables. Ehrlich (2000) derived such solutions 
by  treating  life  protection  as  predetermined.  In  this  study,  we  provide  unconditional 
solutions for all three choice variables, using numerical methods.  
The model’s parameters are, in principle, estimable statistically, but the individual life- 
cycle  data  required  for  such  estimation  are  not  fully  available.  We  rely,  instead,  on 
calibrated simulations of our model’s basic parameters, based on representative group data. 
Our analysis is facilitated by a number of simplifying assumptions, which permit the use of 
the model’s optimality conditions in the simulations. To account for major life protection 
inputs,  we  use  an  aggregate  spending  measure,  which  we  calibrate  empirically  to 
incorporate estimated spending on preventive medical care, workplace safety measures, 
and health-enhancing goods and services (life style). We generally treat life protection as a 
flow, rather than a stock variable, but we also use our methodology to account for the 
durability  of  life  protection  over  finite  periods.  We  assume  that  annuities  and  life 
insurance are available to individuals in private insurance markets at actuarially fair terms, 
but we also develop insights about the impact of social security on optimal life protection.   3 
Despite  these  simplifications  and  related  data  limitations,  our  simulations  are found to 
account for a non-trivial portion of observed variations in life expectancies by age and 
population groups, as well as for a wide range of empirically estimated VLS levels. They 
also yield insights about the relative importance of basic determinants of life protection. 
Value-of-life-saving  estimates  have  so  far  been  derived  mainly  through  regression 
estimates  of  “willingness  to  pay”  (WTP)  opportunity  costs  for  marginal  reductions  in 
mortality risks, based on compensating wage or price differentials in activities associated 
with varying risks to life. But these regressions treat observed mortality risks as exogenous 
variables, whereas we treat observed probabilities of mortality as endogenous outcomes of 
WTP directly for optimally determined life protection. We are thus able to link variations 
in age-specific life expectancies with their implicit VLS counterparts over the life cycle as 
well as in the cross section (see Viscusi, 1993 and Viscusi and Aldy, 2003).
2  Moreover, 
our analysis enables us to offer new insights into the concept and measurement of VLS. 
We conduct two types of calibrated simulations. In the first, we rely on the observed 
rates of age-specific mortality risks for the general population (our benchmark group), as 
reported  by  Vital  and  Health  Statistics  of  the  US  [VS],  to  impute  the  corresponding 
optimal  spending  on  life  protection  and  age-specific  “biological”  mortality  risks.  The 
differences between the realized and projected risks indicate the quantitative impact of life 
protection on realized life expectancy levels. 
In the second, we use the imputed biological mortality risks for our benchmark group to 
project the realized risks of different educational groups, and of our benchmark group over 
time. These simulations permit an assessment of the model’s power to explain diversity in 
life  expectancies  in  the  population.  They  also  provide  alternative  age-specific  VLS   4 
estimates  based  on  a  conventional  “willingness  to  pay”  approach,  which  highlight  the 
dependence of VLS estimates on the length of the interval of time over which they are 
measured.  
We  proceed  as  follows:  Sections  I  and  II  introduce  our  model  and  simulation 
procedure. In section III we calibrate our benchmark case. In sections IV and V we conduct 
simulations explaining life expectancy variations across individuals, groups, and over time. 
We conclude by assessing the model’s power to explain the apparent variability in both life 
expectancies and empirically estimated magnitudes of ‘value of life saving’. 
I. The Theoretical Model And Its Numerical Solution 
The essence of our theoretical approach is the correspondence between efforts to reduce 
mortality risks, which we call “life protection”, and the standard definition of what the 
literature calls “value of life saving”. Under static conditions, the prospect of mortality 
means facing a pair of conditional outcomes: a consumption plan if alive (G), subject to a 
wealth constraint (W) net of life-protection outlays (s), G = (W-s) with utility level U(G), 
or a bequest plan B = (W-s), subject to the same constraints but yielding a lower utility 
level V(B). The underlying mutually exclusive states of the world are “life” and “death”, 
with  probabilities  (1-p)  and  p,  respectively.  Life  protection  outlays  (s)  are  designed  to 
lower p, where p(s) is a continuously differentiable and strictly concave function of s, and 
p’(s=0)  ®  ¥.  Optimal  life  protection  requires  as  a  necessary  condition  the  equality 
between the marginal cost of life protection and its marginal benefit:  
(1)  [-p’(s)] = [(1-p(s))U’(G) +p(s)V’(B)]/[U(G)- V(B)].   
Equation (1) restates the optimal “self-protection” decision in Ehrlich and Becker [EB] 
(1972). Taking its inverse value we obtain:   5 
(2) v(s) º -[1/p’(s)] = [U(G)- V(B))]/[(1-p(s))U’(G) + p(s)V’(B)]. 
The numerator of (2) defines the difference in utility between being alive or dead and the 
denominator of (2) defines the marginal expected utility of wealth. Their ratio defines the 
“shadow price of life protection”, or “willingness to pay” for a marginal reduction in the 
probability of mortality – better known as the “value of life saving” (VLS). Optimal self-
protection and VLS are thus shown to be two sides of the same coin. In EB’s model, the 
self-protection decision is determined jointly with a “market insurance” alternative.  
The model we specify and simulate in this paper is a generalization of this market- 
insurance-self-protection paradigm in several ways: it is formulated as a continuous-time, 
life-cycle consumption prospect subject to stochastic odds of survival to any point in time 
(“age”), under a given age-earnings profile and an initial wealth level, which is inherited as 
the  optimal  bequest  left  by  an  earlier  generation.  It  is  also  a  generalization  of  the 
“insurance” problem analyzed in EB in that two types of “market insurance” are recognized 
simultaneously:  insuring  survivors’  needs  in  the  event  of  ones’  premature  death  (life 
insurance),  and  insuring  one’s  own  old-age  needs  arising  from  unanticipated  longevity 
(annuities purchase). The availability of a market for actuarial notes allows us to solve for 
optimal  consumption  and  bequest  paths  separately  over  the  life  cycle,  to  estimate  the 
“market”  value  of  human  wealth  under  uncertain  work  horizons,  and  to  link  optimal 
bequest of an older generation with initial wealth of its offspring. 
The formal model is outlined in Appendix A. Here we introduce its basic components. 
We  assume  that  the  survival  probabilities  between  any  two  points  in  time  follow  a 
generalized Poisson process:  ￿ - =
j
i ] dt ) t ( f exp[ ) j , i ( S , where f(t) is the time-varying hazard   6 
that death would occur at t, given survival to t. We specify this conditional hazard rate, f(t), 
or "force of mortality", to be controllable on the margin by a concurrent aggregate life 
protection  measure,  I(t),  which  is  an  increasing  function  of  own  time (m), preventive 
health care and safety measures (M), personal efficiency proxied by education (E), and a 
given health-care technology q, i.e., I(t) = I(m(t), M(t); E(t), q(t)).
3  Life protection lowers 
the natural, or biological hazard rate, j(t), which continuously rises with age (at least from 
adulthood), i.e.,  0 ) t ( j
0
> . For convenience, we define the output of life protection efforts in 
units of mortality rates, so f(t) = j(t) - I(t)  ³  0.  
Life protection output is assumed to be subject to diminishing marginal productivity, 
largely because of the finiteness of the human body. The cost of life protection is thus 
specified as an increasing cost function, C(t) = cI(t)
a, where c is the cost of providing "one 
unit" of I(t), and a>1.  This one-unit cost is generally a function of given health-services 
market price and medical technology and one’s wage and human capital (education) paths, 
or c(t) = c(Pm, q, w(t), E(t)), respectively. Since the wage (opportunity cost of time) is 
itself a function of human capital, w(t)=w(E(t)), and the two have opposite effects on c, we 
abstract  from  any  drift  in  c  over  the  life  cycle  or  in  the  cross  section,  by  invoking  a 
“neutrality” assumption about the net effect of human capital on unit costs.
4 
We assume the existence of competitive markets for actuarial notes (life insurance and 
annuities) that are actuarially fair to individuals. This simplification enables us to treat real 
“consumption” spending Z(t) (net of life protection) and bequest B(t), i.e., life insurance 
and  accumulated  ordinary  savings  (which  survive  one’s  death),  as  separate  objects  of 
choice, along with life protection, as well as to derive conditional closed-form solutions for   7 
our  control  variables.  It  also  facilitates  the  assessment  of  the  “market”  values  of  both 
human wealth, i.e., the capitalized value of future earnings stream net of life protection 
costs L(t), and non-human wealth, A(t), i.e., the annuity-equivalent of regular savings and 
all annuities, as defined in equations (A.2a) and (A.3a) in Appendix A.1. The objective 
function is the additive expected lifetime utility (J) having a stochastic time of death, D
~ : 





I , B , Z ￿ - r - + - r - = h  
where U(Z) = (1/k)Z
k, V(B,t) = [n(t)/k]B
k, 0<k<1 to assure concavity, r is a subjective 
discount factor, and ￿ is a parameters vector. The expectation operator E is defined over 
the density function of the endogenous mortality risks. Since age at deathD
~  is stochastic, 
the  optimization  problem  must  be  defined  over  some  planning  horizon  D  £  ¥.  The 
boundary conditions restrict annuity wealth, A(t), to be exhausted at D (see equation A.4). 
To  facilitate  the  dynamic  simulations,  the  model  treats  life  protection  as  a  flow 
variable. In section IV.C.1, however, we simulate the model by allowing life-protection to 
have a durable effect on future mortality rates.  Also, we do not model morbidity risk 
(health) as a direct argument entering the utility function, although implicitly we take it to 
be monotonically related to mortality risk (see Ehrlich, 2000), since the material impact of 
life  protection  on  morbidity  is  captured  by  the  actual  earnings  data  we  use  in  our 
simulations, w(t), which reflects labor time lost to illness. To mitigate the omission of 
health as utility, however, we also conduct simulations in which the value of healthy time 
is imputed as part of our definition of “full earnings” (see subsection IV.B.5).  
Equation (3) allows for “bequest” just as a financial legacy. It thus implicitly includes 
in “consumption” any investments a family head makes in raising and educating children,   8 
who  provide  altruistic  benefits  as  well  as  informal-care  and  support  at  old  age.  The 
accumulated financial wealth we derive should thus be interpretable as accounting, in part, 
for such parental investments. In addition, the model assumes all annuities to be private, 
although in practice annuity income and related taxes come largely from social security. In 
our baseline simulations A(t) thus accounts, in principle, for social security as well. In 
section IV.C.2, however, we treat social security wealth as a separate wealth component.   
The first-order optimality conditions are given in Appendix A. The model’s parameters 
are the age profiles of the biological mortality density j(t), the real wage profile, w[E(t)], 
and the time-invariant parameters associated with the real return on capital (r), and the 
utility  and  health-production  cost  functions  (r,  k,  n,  c,  a)  as  defined  above  and  in 
Appendix  A.  The  optimized  “control  variables”  are  the  time-varying  paths  of  life 
protection, I(t), consumption, Z(t), and bequest, B(t), under a given planning horizon (D £ 
¥). These dictate the resulting “state variables” paths – net human and non-human wealth, 
L(t) and A(t), and the mortality density function f(t), hence life expectancy T
*(t). 
A key co-state variable in the model is the shadow price of life protection, measuring 
the value of a marginal reduction in the force of mortality, f(t), or the private value of life 
saving. Its optimal solution is given by 
(4) v
*(t) =  (1/k)L(t)+[(1-k)/k][A(t)-B
*(t)] = z(t)[A(t) + L(t)] - A(t) = acI*(t)
a-1                            
with A(t), L(t), and z(t)>1, defined in equations (A.2a), (A.3a) and (A.13) of appendix A. 
     The closed-form solution of v*(t) in equation (4) represents a dynamic version of the 
static VLS in equation (2). Like equation (2) it is conditional, however, on the mortality 
density f(t), which affects the values of z(t), L(t) and A(t) and is an endogenous outcome of 
optimal life protection, I
*(t). The latter is found by equating the value of life saving with its   9 
marginal  cost,  v*(t)  =  acI*(t)
a-1.  The  age-varying  VLS  can  thus  be  inferred  from  the 
optimal “willingness to pay” for a marginal increase in life protection, which is determined 
jointly with optimal consumption and bequest, Z*(t) and B*(t) (see Appendix A). Note that 
A(t)-B*(t) measures the optimal demand for annuities at different age levels.  
An immediate implication of equation (4) is the greater importance of human relative 
to non-human wealth in determining age-specific VLS. The intuitive reason is that human 
wealth can be realized at any given age only upon survival to that age. It thus has a greater 
weight in determining the optimal path of life protection efforts over the life cycle. 
It is impossible to obtain closed-form solutions for all endogenous variables, but we 
make use of conditional closed-form solutions of the system obtained by first taking life 
protection  to  be  predetermined  (see  Appendix  A.2).  Here  we  derive  unconditional 
solutions  for  all  choice  variables  through  an  iterative  procedure  described  below.  The 
stochastic dynamic programming method used to solve the model (see, e.g., Judd, 1998) 
produces time-consistent life-cycle paths of these endogenous variables starting from any 
given age, t, conditional on survival to t.  
II.  THE ITERATIVE METHOD 
We combine our conditional closed-form solutions for consumption, bequest, and the 
value of life-saving function along with the first-order condition for optimal life protection, 
as given in Appendix A, to derive unconditional solutions for all choice variables through 
an iterative procedure described in Appendix B.  
  As a starting point, we need to explain our treatment of mortality rates, which is a key 
input in our iterations.  No data are available on “biological” rates, j(t). What we observe in 
practice are the actual mortality rates f(t), which we take to be the difference between the   10 
biological rates and the impact of life-protection, or f(t) =  j(t) - I(t). In our benchmark case 
we then calibrate our simulations by taking the observed average mortality rates for the 
entire US population as the solution for f(t), and project the optimal age-profile of self-
protection activity that accounts for it. We thus impute the group’s implicit  biological 
mortality  density  j(t).  For  specific  population  groups,  we  can  similarly  impute  group-
specific  biological  densities  from  the  observed  ones,  if  available,  or  use  the  imputed 
biological density for the benchmark group as the actual densities of the specific-groups.
5   
The simulations we conduct converge quite rapidly and smoothly under widely varying 
values of the model’s underlying parameters. In most cases, the iterations converge on a 
stable solution after just 4 or 5 iterations. The solutions are also found to be locally unique, 
since when we use different starting values (initializations) of I(t) (see Appendix B), the 
system converges on the same numerical solutions for all endogenous variables. 
III.  CALIBRATING THE MODEL 
We  calibrate  the  basic  parameters  of  the  model  using  actual  data  and  independent 
studies. Some of our calibrations apply to the entire population (our benchmark group) 
while others vary across population groups, based on available data.
  
A. Age-Specific Mortality Density 
We start with the observed profile of average age-specific mortality rates, f(t), for the 
US population in 1996, which we take from VS (1999; Series 2, No. 129, Table 1). The VS 
life table contains discrete, and somewhat noisy annual death rates from age 0 to 100.  To 
smooth out this annual series, specified as a generalized Poisson density function, f(t), we 
convert it to a continuous function by assuming that f(t) follows a “local” linear trend 
within each year. We also take the growth rate of f(t) at time t to be the average growth rate   11 
of f(t) over the time periods t-1 and t+1.  The constant term of the projected linear trend is 
then derived from the constraint that the integral  value of the affected fatality density 
should equal  ) q - ln(1 - t , where qt is the death rate at time t. 
One remaining problem is that, while life tables end at age 100, we need to project 
mortality rates up to age 107, and even up to 150 in our sensitivity analyses (see section 
III.E).  Following the technical recommendation in the VS report, we extend our death rate 
series  beyond  age  100  using  the  relationship 
t k
1 t t e q q ) t , 1 t ( p 1 - = º - - ,  where 
) 85 t ( s k k 85 t - + = , and the report’s recommended values for k85 and s. 
B.  The Earnings Profile 
The age-earnings profiles we use are the average labor earnings of employees and self-
employed workers of different age groups as well as of different sex and schooling levels 
in 1996, as listed in the Statistical Abstract of the United States [SAUS] (1998, Table 246). 
These data are converted into a continuous wage profile, w(t), by fitting a cubic trend, since 
market wages are reported only up to age 65 and are projected to age 80, assuming that 
earnings are negligible past that age. While our model is interpretable as relating to "full-
earnings”, including the value of healthy time in both life protection and home production, 
we allow for arbitrary estimates of the latter only as part of our comparative dynamics and 
sensitivity  analysis.  In  our  baseline  simulations  we  use  reported  labor  earnings  and 
monetary spending to calibrate w(t) and the unit cost of life protection.  
C.  The one-unit Cost of Life Protection 
An  important  challenge  is  estimating  the  “one-unit”  cost  of  self-protection,  c.  The 
estimate we arrive at for our baseline group is c= 3.4 “units”.
6  We calibrate this parameter,   12 
based on our specification of the life-protection cost function, to ensure that our projected 
value of the average annual life-protection spending per person over the middle-age bracket 
40  to  49  would  account  for  available data on three major categories of life-protection 
spending (regardless of source of financing): “preventive” medical care, work-place safety 
costs based on mandated OSHA requirements, and private spending on diet and exercise 
representing preventive efforts associated with life-style choices.  
Medical care expenditures by age are available from the Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey of 1996. We distinguished discretionary “preventive care”, which protects a person 
in a healthy state from reaching a potentially acute state of illness, from “remedial care”, 
which  is  spent  in  a  state  of  illness  to  avert  potential  life-threatening  conditions,  since 
theoretically, our life-protection spending is inherently discretionary. Based on an expert 
physician’s assessment, we set the preventive care portion of total spending at 46.27%, 
allowing  for  a  range  of  deviations  around  this  figure  in  our  actual  simulations.
7 
Assessments  of  the  total  cost  of  mandatory  OSHA  regulations  per  worker  are  hotly 
disputed in the literature – we have thus used a conservative lower-bound assessment, 
taken from Harvey (1998), by which this cost constitutes 0.866 % of average annual wages. 
We extrapolated the annual spending on diet and exercise using Nachtrieb (2003).
8  
D. Other Parameters 
Since there are no available data on individual financial endowments at age 18, (A(0)), 
we impute this variable iteratively via our dynamic simulation procedure so as to match 
the expected value of bequest left by a parent who dies one generation (25 years) ahead 
(i.e., at age 43), discounted by the average mortality rates of parents through that age. We 
make the same adjustment to A(0) whenever we vary any of our basic parameters. For our   13 
baseline case, this method sets the financial endowment at A(0) = $6,315 (see IV.A).  
We set the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption k in equations (3) and (A.9) 
to be 0.5, so the degree of relative risk aversion, d = (1-k), is 0.5 as well.  The implied 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (s) is thus 2, which falls within the 
range  of  estimated  values  of  s  in  many  econometric  studies.    The  intensity  of  utility 
derived from bequest, n (see equation (A.10) in Appendix A), is calibrated to be constant at 
1.2.
9 Theoretically, n is the square root of the ratio of bequest to consumption in our model 
(see equations (A.14) and (A.15) in Appendix A).  The Statistical Abstract of the United 
States for 1998 sets the total ordinary life insurance in force in 1996 (which we take to be 
the main indicator of intended bequest) at $8.337 trillion, and personal consumption at 
$5.208 trillion, producing a rounded ratio of 1.5, and justifying n=1.2.  The real interest 
rate, r, is calibrated to be 3.2%, a conservative estimate of the long-term real rate of return 
on  a  total  portfolio  of  financial  and  non-financial  assets,
10 and  the  time  preference 
parameter, r,  is  set  at  1.5%.  This  variable  is  calibrated so as to make our benchmark 
simulation of the non-human annuity-wealth accumulation per family head approach the 
level of mean family wealth, as gleaned from official statistics (see fn. 11).  
We set the planning horizon to start at age 18 because market wage income prior to this 
age is quite low, and most juveniles do not make independent consumption, health, and 
bequest choices. Starting our simulations at age 18 (or 25 in section V.C) supports our 
treatment of schooling in this paper as a largely predetermined variable.   
E. The Planning Horizon. 
A critical parameter to be selected is the terminal point of the planning horizon, D. In 
principle D is infinite, as we place no upper limit on biological survival. We choose a finite   14 
horizon,  however,  because  our  stochastic  dynamic  optimization  problem  and  our 
simulations require a finite D, and because the rising biological mortality risks with age, 
and  the  finiteness  of  human  wealth  make  it  inexpedient  to  plan  on  potential  survival 
beyond some distant, but finite age. Yet, to specify such an age a priori defeats the basic 
premise of the model, which treats survival probabilities as a choice variable.  
A logical remedy would be to set D to be sufficiently distant so that the simulation 
results would be practically invariable to its value. This can be done by computing the 
maximized  expected  utility  from  living  J(D)  (see  equation  (3))  at  alternative  terminal 
planning dates.  For any given set of parameter values, we plot J(D) as a function of D. The 
results, based on our benchmark parameter set, are striking. Figure 1 shows that although 
J(D) is a monotonically increasing function of D, it becomes asymptotic to a finite level. 
Specifically, J(D) first rises sharply at young ages, then more slowly at older age levels, but 
becomes essentially flat after age 100. The conventional stopping rule we adopt sets D at 
the point where the increase in J(D) falls below 10
-5 percent. This occurs at age 107.  
Indeed, higher values of D result in virtually no changes in the solutions for the model’s 
endogenous variables, and the solutions remain virtually identical regardless of whether we 
start our simulations at age 18 or at age 75, for example. Our selected value of D=107 is 
not inconsistent with the sharp upward trend in longevity in the US.  
IV.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
A. The Baseline Case  
      The simulation results for our benchmark group (the total population) are presented in 
Table 1. Figures 2-6 also present the simulated age profiles of key variables: the value of 
human  and  non-human  wealth,  the  value  of  life  saving,  v(t),  the  actual  vs.  imputed   15 
“biological” mortality rates, f(t) v. j(t), and the profile of the age-specific (remaining) life 
expectancy T
*(t).  We skip the age profiles of consumption (Z) and bequest (B), which are 
proportionally related (B* = n
1/dZ* by equations A.14 and A.15) since the rate of growth of 
both is a constant, [(r-r)/(1-k)], as can be shown using equations (A.7) and (A.5). 
Figure  2  shows  the  age-specific  (remaining)  expected  net  human  wealth  L(t), 
representing the capitalized sums of remaining “net earning flows” (the difference between 
employment earnings and expenditures on self-protection), discounted for both the cost of 
future funds and mortality risks (see equation A.3a). While the observed earnings profile 
peaks at age 49, human wealth peaks at age 29 and declines continuously afterwards.  This 
profile reflects both increasing expenses for life protection and increasing fatality rates.  
Indeed, our simulated value of human wealth in Figure 2, based just on market wages, 
becomes negative after age 80, which is our last age with (projected) positive earnings. In 
the  following  section,  however,  we  also  present  simulations  based  on  “full  earnings” 
adjustments, designed to capture the value of healthy time in “home production” as well. 
The  annuity-equivalent  non-human  wealth  age  profile  A(t)
*  (Figure  3),  defined  in 
equation (A.2a), has the usual intertemporal humped shape, starting at an endogenously 
solved bequeathed endowment at age 18, A(0), and falling back towards A(D)=0 at the end 
of  the  planning  horizon.  We  link  iteratively  A(0)  to  optimal  bequest  from  an  older 
generation (25 years apart). In our benchmark case, planned bequest (transferable savings 
and life insurance) for a 43-year old parent is projected at $31,575.  However, since only 
20% of the parent' s generation would expire by age 43, we take 20% of $31,575, or $6,315, 
to be our benchmark inheritance level of an average offspring at age 18 (in a two-parent 
family with 2 children).  Given our perfect capital market assumption, this figure stays the   16 
same regardless of whether the parent' s death occurs at an age younger or older than 43, as 
long as the age gap between parent and offspring remains 25.
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Figure  4  shows  the  equilibrium  age-specific  ‘value-of-life-saving’  profile,  v*(t), 
defined in equation (4) and (A.13).  Since the optimal value of life saving is also equal to 
the equilibrium marginal cost of (or “willingness to spend on”) life protection, or v*(t) = 
acI*(t)
a-1 (we set a=2 in our baseline simulation), the v*(t) and I*(t) age-profiles share the 
same shape, and we therefore skip a separate presentation of I*(t).  The v*(t) profile is also 
hump-shaped, starting at a low level and falling to zero at the end of the planning horizon, 
D.  In Figure 4, v*(t) (in 1996 dollars) starts at $1.191 million at age 18, peaks at $1.435 
million at age 38, and falls sharply after 48. This reflects the influence of the changing 
magnitudes of human and non-human wealth and the rates of return on annuities (see Table 
2). Although the value of life saving falls to zero at the end of the planning horizon, it 
remains quite high through old age (see Table 1). 
This  pattern  is  somewhat  different  from  the  shape  of  the  “value  of  life-extension” 
profile in Ehrlich and Chuma (EC) (1990), which is monotonically increasing with age, 
essentially because our model recognizes the potential of death at any age over the life 
cycle, rather than at an artificially assumed certain (though endogenous) age. Since the 
value of lowering the probability of mortality at a given age is influenced by the expected 
length of one’s remaining (uncertain) life span, which shrinks as one advances in age, the 
value-of-life-saving profile in this analysis is more closely related to that of the ‘value of 
healthy life’ in EC’s paper. Indeed, an interesting feature of the simulated v
*(t) profile in 
Figure 4 is that it remains fairly flat about the age in which it reaches its peak value. For the 
baseline  case,  v
*(t)  varies  less  than  2.5%  from  its  peak  between  age  30  and  46.  This   17 
remains the case for different parameter values of n and k, or r, except that the flat segment 
covers a different range of ages. For r=4%, for example, v
*(t) varies less than 2.5% from its 
peak at age 55 between the years 44 and 65. 
Figure 5 enables us to explore a central theme of the paper – the quantitative impact of 
life protection on the age-specific fatality rates and life expectancies – by comparing the 
actual and our imputed (“biological”) fatality rates. The plot reveals, not surprisingly, a 
diminishing importance of life-protection efforts in affecting rising mortality risks as the 
biological risks increase significantly, especially at older age levels.  Over the average life 
span – ages 18 to 77 (the actual life expectancy at age 18) – average life protection, ) t ( I , is 
seen to account for 17.81% of the projected average “biological” mortality risk, ) t ( j .  
      To complete the simulations, we also provide in Table 1 and Figure 6 the age profiles 
of life expectancy T
*(t) =  du ) t u )( u ( f )] u , t ( m [ exp
D
t - - ￿ , where m(t,u)  ￿ º
u
t ds ) s ( f , based on 
both our estimated biological, and the actual, age profiles of mortality rates.  The gap 
between the two indicates that life protection accounts for about 3.426 years, or a 6.16% 
improvement over our imputed “biological” life expectancy of our benchmark group at age 
18, and about 0.065 years, or 0.66% at age 77.
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B.  Comparative Dynamics and Sensitivity Tests 
The simulations we conduct to estimate comparative-dynamic effects are based on our 
imputed  biological,  rather  than  the  observed,  age-specific  mortality  rates  for  the 
benchmark  group,  since  the  latter  are  endogenous  in  our  model.  The  key  results  are 
summarized in Table 2. While all our reported simulations begin at age 18, we have also 
tested the sensitivity of our results to a starting age of 22, partly to justify our treatment of   18 
schooling as a predetermined variable for our benchmark group. The results concerning 
projected  mortality  risks  remain  virtually  unaffected (to the 4th decimal point) by this 
change, and the differences concerning other endogenous variables are less than 1% at 
comparable ages. Comparative dynamic effects are assessed by varying the level of each of 
our parameters 25% above and below its calibrated value.
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B.1. Varying relative risk aversion. 
Since a lower k implies a higher degree of relative risk aversion, we expect it to lower 
exposure to life-risking activities, i.e., to increase the value of life saving and the demand 
for life protection (see eq. 4). Changes in k may have little quantitative effect on net human 
wealth, L(t), because of their opposite impacts on f*(t) and on spending on life protection 
(see eq. A.3a), but the impact on non-human wealth A(t) can be higher: Greater relative 
risk aversion (a lower k) increases consumption at young ages while reducing the optimal 
rate of growth of consumption and bequest, thus savings and asset accumulation.  
Table 2 confirms these results. As k falls from 0.625 to 0.375, the peak v
*(t) rises from 
$1.186 to $1.823 million at age 38; the gap between biological and actual mortality risks 
rises from 2.817 to 4.419; and life expectancy at 18 rises from 58.49 to 60.09. 
B.2. Varying unit cost and marginal productivity of life protection.   
Table 2 indicates that larger values of c arising from higher medical care prices or a less 
effective  medical  technology  (q),  greatly  lower  self-protection  and  life  expectancy, 
especially at age 18, but they marginally raise the value of life saving at all ages. This is 
not paradoxical.  A larger c generates opposing effects on the demand for self-protection 
and its cost, thus on the value of life saving, v* = acI*(c)
a-1 (see equation A.6).  VLS can 
fall or rise as a result, depending upon whether the elasticity of demand for life protection   19 
with respect to c exceeds or falls short of 1.  Our simulations indicate that optimal life-
protection, I*(c), falls by almost the same proportion as the increase in c; therefore a higher 
c slightly increases VLS:  At age 38, the peak value of v* rises from $1.432 to $1.437 
million as c rises from 2.55 to 4.25. Average spending on life protection, cI
a (a=2), falls 
by about 50% at age 38, while life expectancy at 18 falls from 60.29 to 58.39.  
The  impact  of  an  increase  in  the  marginal  productivity  of  life  protection  due  the 
parameter a of the cost of life protection function C(t) = cI(t)
a, has, of course, just the 
reverse effect to that of a higher unit cost of life protection, c.
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B.3. Varying real interest rate. 
     Theoretically,  an  increase  in  r  lowers  human  wealth,  L(t)  and  increases  the  rate  of 
accumulation of non-human assets, A(t). The impact on the value of life saving, v*(t), 
which is a non-linear function of L(t) and A(t) (see equation A.2a), is thus two-fold:  a 
higher r may increase v*(t) at older ages, where A(t)/L(t) is relatively high, but it lowers it 
at young ages. These changes work to affect mainly the age at which v*(t), hence life 
protection, I*(t), peak.  These predictions are borne out by Figure 4. The projected peak 
value of v*(t) (1996 dollars) changes from $1.534 million at age 28, to $1.523 million at 
age 55 as r increases from 2.4% to 4.0%. The corresponding impact on life expectancy is 
not monotonically related to r, and relatively modest, as shown in Table 2.  
B.4. Varying bequest preferences  
By the conditional, closed-form solutions of our model (see equations (A.13)-(A.15)), a 
higher  bequest  preference  lowers  the  demand  for  life  protection,  essentially  because 
placing a higher value on the legacy to heirs lowers the marginal value of longevity. Our 
“bequest  preference”  parameter  (n)  captures,  however,  only  benefits  associated  with   20 
financial legacy. Even under this limited bequest preference concept, however, Table 2 
indicates that variations in n produce only minor changes. A higher n motivates a switch 
from own consumption to bequest (life insurance and regular savings), but also a higher 
asset accumulation to enable a higher bequest level.  The optimal values of v*(t) and I*(t) 
thus fall only moderately as n rises. 
B.5. Varying wage income streams 
As already mentioned, reported age-earnings profiles, w(t), while capturing the return 
on healthy time (low morbidity risk) in the labor market, do not capture the full benefits of 
healthy time as a producer good. One way to account for the latter (assuming that mortality 
and  morbidity  risks  are  monotonically  related)  is  to  measure  market  earnings  as  “full 
earnings”, incorporating the opportunity cost of healthy time in home production.  Since no 
accurate measures exist, we experiment with implicit full earnings measures that are 25% 
or 50% higher than observed labor-market earnings.
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Higher full earnings raise human wealth (indirectly asset accumulation as well), and 
thus the demand for life protection, since the only way to secure future earnings is through 
survival.  Indeed, I*(t) and v*(t) rise almost proportionally with w(t). In particular, the peak 
value of v*(t) rises from $1.435 to $2.141 million as w(t) rises 50% from its reported level. 
The corresponding life expectancy at age 18 increases from 59.10 to 60.89 years.  
B.6.  Varying initial endowments of non-human wealth 
Although equation (A.13) indicates that an exogenous change in A(0) would raise the 
value of life saving, the increase appears relatively modest in our simulations. When initial 
wealth increases from $6315 by 25% or 50%, peak v*(t) rises from $1.435 to $1.437 or 
$1.439 million at age 38.  Note that the effect of a 25% increase in wage income, leading to   21 
an approximately equal percentage rise in human wealth at age 18 (L(0)), has a 24.5% 
larger effect on v*(t), and a 25.7% larger effect on life expectancy at age 18, than that of an 
equal percentage increase in the initial financial endowment, A(0). This confirms a key 
implication of our model about the larger importance of human wealth, relative to human 
wealth in determining the value of life saving (see section I and Appendix A.2). 
B.7.  Varying health endowments 
It may appear that better endowed health, i.e., a lower biological mortality risk, j(t), 
could  lower  optimal  life  protection  (I*(t)),  as  life  expectancy  then  rises  even  without 
additional effort. Our model indicates, however, that the likely outcome could be a rise in 
life protection. This is because the wealth effect generated by a longer life expectancy 
increases the value of life saving. Indeed, although the rates of return on actuarial savings 
(r+f(t)) fall, non-human wealth accumulation A(t) rises because of greater savings. More 
important, the capitalized values of human wealth L(t) unambiguously rise because of the 
reduced mortality risks. Table 2 indicates that both optimal life protection outlays and life 
expectancy increase as j(t) decreases 25% about its projected age profile. 
C. Simulated Extensions of our Model  
C.1.  Allowing for durable effects of life-protection outlays. 
Our model treats life protection at a given age as impacting only contemporaneous 
mortality risks. A more general approach would be to allow for durable effects that last 
through  future  years  as  well.  A  full  recognition  of  durability  requires  a  significant 
generalization  of  our  model,  which  we  leave for future work. We can use the current 
framework, however, to assess the qualitative impact of a discrete change in the duration 
of life protection’s impact through a simple experiment.   22 
Starting with our imputed “biological” mortality risks, j(t), we approximate the impact 
of higher (lower) durability of a given investment in life protection at age 39, I(39), by 
letting it cause an exogenous decline (increase) in the endowed mortality risks, j(t), over 
the subsequent 10-year period, since the objective of the experiment is to assess how such 
implicit durability shift affects the entire age profile of optimal life protection, I*(t), hence 
f*(t), and T
*(t). We carry out the simulations under two alternative assumptions: a. the 
impact of the shift will last for 10 years and then disappear at the end of the 10
th year; b. the 
impact would decay at a constant rate and become zero at the end of the 10
th year. 
Naturally, an increase in the implicit durability of I(39) raises life-protection’s efficacy, 
hence  the  demand  for  life  protection,  especially  at  relatively  young  ages,  because  life 
protection has a lingering effect on future as well as current mortality risks. At the same 
time, the fall in future mortality risks lowers the risk premium on annuities, which raises 
the discounted value of future wages, but lowers annuity wealth, which may lower the 
value of life saving at older ages. The net effect of higher durability appears to be a change 
in  the  age  profile  of  life  protection  outlays.  It  raises  life  protection,  and  hence  life 
expectancy, at younger relative to older ages, and these effects are naturally stronger the 
slower is the rate at which the investment impact depreciates. The changes in the age 
profiles of the value of life saving exhibit the same pattern (see Table 3A). 
C.2.  The impact of social security 
Our model ascribes all annuity savings to private annuities. The impact of a pay-as-
you-go, defined-benefits social security system can be integrated in our simulations by 
imposing social security taxes at working age levels, and adding the defined social security 
benefits at retirement ages for our benchmark group. Specifically, we imposed a 6.2% tax   23 
rate on the wage-income profile of our benchmark group in 1996, while adding untaxed 
benefits  of  $16,614  post  age  65,  using  the  web  “calculator”  of  the  Social  Security 
Administration. We then recomputed the resulting age-earnings profile after applying the 
6.2% tax rate to our smoothed earnings profile, as originally calibrated. 
Accounting for social security as a distinct “annuity” program produces a significant 
change  in  the  structure  of  life  protection  spending:  since  social  security  is  a  defined-
benefits, rather than a defined-contributions, scheme, it is shown to create an incentive to 
postpone spending on life protection to later years, rather than earlier years, which are 
subject to actuarially unfair taxes. This is reflected by the commensurate change in the 
structure of v*(t).  Furthermore, the simulations in Table 3B suggest that the existence of 
social security leads to higher life expectancies and VLS at older age levels (see Ehrlich, 
2000, section VI and a related result in Philipson and Becker, 1998).  
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL 
We  now  proceed  to  examine  the  power  of  our  model  to  explain,  or  project, 
diversities  in age-specific life expectancies and values of life saving across population 
groups.  These  simulations  are  constrained,  however,  by  the  limited  data  available  to 
calibrate group-specific parameters. Available data include mainly age-earnings profiles 
and age-specific mortality rates, or life expectancies. Little else is available for calibrating 
group- and age-specific parameters concerning home production, education, cost of life 
protection,  access  to  medical  care,  or  access  to  financial  markets.
16 In  the  following 
section,  we  focus  on  explaining  projected  or  observed  differences  in  age-specific  life 
expectancies and VLS among different educational groupings for the male population, and 
for the general population over time, since differences in group-specific earnings profiles   24 
may constitute a predominant source of heterogeneity across these population groups. In 
both cases we employ the biological mortality risks we imputed for our benchmark group, 
to project group-specific life expectancies and compare these to observed ones. 
A. Life Expectancy Gaps Across Schooling brackets  
Under the “neutrality assumption” invoked in our baseline case, education does not 
alter the “unit” cost of life protection, c, because it raises both efficiency at life protection 
and the opportunity cost of time devoted to it. Our model suggests, however, a more direct 
link  between  education  and  life  protection:  since  the  more  educated  possess  relatively 
higher human wealth, L(t), they will have a higher incentive to protect this wealth through 
survival.  To  what  extent  would  this  factor  alone  explain  the  observed  gaps  in  life 
expectancy across educational classes? 
To answer this question, we impose a common profile of biological mortality rates for 
males of all educational classes - the j(t) density imputed in our analysis of US males in the 
preceding section (the emphasis on males is clarified below) - since no separate VS data 
are reported for specific classes.  We then consider four education groups: those holding 
High School, Bachelor, Master, and Doctorate degrees. Wage income profiles for these 
groups are from the SAUS, 1998 Table 246, Earnings, by Highest Degree Earned: 1996.   
The results are summarized in Table 4. We start our simulations at age 25, to allow for 
a reasonable representation of all education groups in the labor market. The simulations 
indicate that people with more education have a higher human and non-human wealth and 
thus value of life saving. They also spend more on consumption than others as a result of 
their greater total wealth.  Their non-human wealth profile is thus relatively lower initially, 
but becomes higher at older age levels. The VLS profile peaks at age 37 for high school   25 
graduates and at age 40 for Doctorates. The peak values range from $1.282 million for high 
school graduates to $3.228 million for Doctorate holders. 
Next  we  project  the  impact  of  the  differential  levels  life  protection  undertaken  by 
different educational groups on their life expectancies.  These projections can be compared 
with life-expectancy estimates for males of all races by educational attainments in 1990 in 
Richards  and  Barry  [RB]  (1998,  Table  5(a)),  who  linked  death  certificates  data  with 
attained individual schooling. Clearly, our educational categories are not fully comparable 
with  those  estimated  by  RB.  Nevertheless,  we  come  close  to  RB’s  estimated  life 
expectancies for high school at most ages. Comparing the estimated life expectancy gap 
between those with high school v. a Bachelor degree in each study, our projected gap 
explains 47% (=1.43/3) of the actual gap estimated by RB at age 30, 38% at age 38, and 
20% at age 55 (the latter two not shown in the table). Our projected life-expectancy gaps 
between those with high school and a Doctorate degree explain an even larger percentage 
of the actual gap estimated by RB between those with a High School v. the highest degree 
(64% at age 30, 51.5% at age 38 and 23.7% at age 55).
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B. The Overall Trend in Life Expectancy  
We next extrapolate the time trend of life expectancy for the average wage earner in the 
economy  from  1996  backwards.  Once  again,  the  only  variable  readily  available  for 
calibration over time is the real wage income of the representative worker.
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The simulation analysis is similar to the one we performed in section IV. We take as a 
point  of  reference  the  “biological”  age-specific  mortality  profile  we  estimated  for  our 
benchmark group in 1996, j(96), and project the realized age-specific life expectancies 
backwards over the period 1970-1990. We interpolate the shifts in the age-earnings profile   26 
based on the rate of growth in average wage income over the same period, as reported by 
USCB (2000). Our age-specific life expectancy projections are given for 5-year intervals at 
age 20, to make them comparable to the actually reported age-specific life expectancies, 
which we take from National Vital Statistics Report and various volumes of Vital Statistics 
of United States. The results are summarized in Table 5.  
The simulations explain a good part of the actual changes in life expectancy between 
1970 and 1996. For the entire period between 1996 and 1970, our projected growth in the 
conditional life expectancy at age 20 explains 25.66% (=1.07/4.17) of the actual growth. 
For  the  more  recent  period  between  1980  and  1996,  our  projected  growth  of  life 
expectancy  at  age  20  explains  33.33%  (=0.57/1.71)  of  its  actual  growth.  This  is  not 
insignificant given that we do not allow for any improvement in medical technology. If we 
assume that our one-unit cost of life protection fell at an annual rate of 1% over 1970-1990 
as a result of improving life saving technologies (which is also the growth rate of the 
economy’s total factor productivity), our simulations would now explain 37.65% of the 
growth in life expectancy between 1970 and 1996 or 56.73% of the growth between 1980 
and 1996. This higher explanatory power reflects the considerable influence of c on life 
expectancy (see Table 2). As for imputed values of life saving, our simulations indicate 
that VLS increased by 1.56% per annum over the period 1970-1996, which roughly mimics 
the growth rate of real wage earnings in that period.   
C.  Alternative Values of Life Saving Computed via a Conventional WTP Approach 
The age-specific values of life saving (VLS) in Tables 1-4 are simulated by solving for 
the marginal cost of life protection, [acI(t)
a-1]
* since its equilibrium value is equated to the 
shadow price of life protection, v*(t). This method of solving for VLS illustrates a direct   27 
“willingness to pay” (WTP) approach, since v*(t) thus measures the willingness to pay for 
the added life protection costs needed to gain the utility benefit from a marginal reduction 
in  the  conditional  mortality  hazard  rate  at  a  point  in  time  (see  equation  A.6).  By 
comparison, conventional WTP measures of VLS are based on regression estimates of 
wage premiums workers are willing to forgo for bearing marginally lower occupational 
mortality probabilities, typically over a given year. These measure “compensating” wage 
differentials, assuming workers are homogeneous and labor markets are competitive.  
Our model can be used to simulate analogous WTP estimates. In the illustration below, 
we  raise  the  density  function  of  j(t)  of  our  benchmark  group  to  effect  (via  proper 
integration) an exogenous rise in the probability of mortality ￿p(t) by 1/10000 over one 
year (age). We next simulate the optimal increase in the annual wage flow, ￿w*(t), needed 
to keep expected lifetime utility intact. VLS is the ratio of the two, V*(t)= ￿w*/￿p(t). 
Our two VLS measures are conceptually different. V*(t) is defined over an interval of 
time,  while  v*(t)  is  defined  at a point in time.  Which concept is relevant empirically 
depends  on  whether  individuals  perceive  of  the  relevant  risk  to  their  life  as  being 
operational over an interval of time, and adjust their plans accordingly, or whether they 
react to the conditional hazard rates they face at any moment in time. Both concepts are 
valid under different circumstances or institutional arrangements.  
Technically, in a continuous-time setting the time-interval estimate of VLS, V*(t), is an 
approximation of its point estimate, v*(t). To simulate the latter using compensating wage 
differentials, the change in the mortality density must be imposed over an infinitesimally 
short time interval, rather than over one-year. Indeed, as we narrow down the time interval 
used for computing V*(t), its value approaches that of v*(t). The simulations show that the   28 
estimated age-specific values of V*(t), assessed over a one year period, are roughly 84% 
higher than those of v*(t) at all ages, essentially because of the greater loss of utility from 
adjusting  to  an  interval  change  in  probability  of  mortality,  rather  than  adjusting 
continuously to changes in the mortality density all along the time interval.
19 But the age 
profiles of v*(t) and V*(t) are virtually identical when adjusted for scale (see Table 6).  
Despite their methodological similarity, our numerical estimates of V*(t), while closer 
in  magnitude  reported  regression  estimates  of  VLS  (see,  e.g.,  Viscusi  1993),  are  not 
comparable to the latter for three main reasons: a. The estimated V*(t) (or v*(t)) do not 
account for the utility gain from reduced morbidity or injury due to life protection, although 
our earnings data do reflect corresponding earnings gains. On this score, our V*(t)s may 
typically  underestimate  the  empirically  estimated  VLS,  which  are  based  on  the  wage 
compensations accepted by workers for assuming higher mortality and morbidity risks; b. 
The empirical studies take the observed differences in mortality probabilities, say, across 
occupations, to be nature’s choice, although by our analysis, they are endogenous variables. 
Our simulations indicate that increases in exogenous mortality risks (j(t) produce smaller 
increases  in  observed  risks  due  to  the  intervening  effects  of  life  protection;  treating 
observed risks as exogenous can thus result in overstated values of VLS; c. We project a 
wide diversity of V*(t) by age, which regression estimates of VLS do not pin down.   
CONCLUSION 
The primary contribution of this paper is methodological: projecting jointly variations 
in age-specific life expectancies and values of life saving (VLS) by simulating a life-cycle 
model with endogenous mortality risks. Although the iterative methodology we use is well 
known, its application to a stochastic-dynamic model of life protection with endogenous   29 
risks  of  mortality  is  novel,  especially  our  iterative  determination  of  a  finite  planning 
horizon along with the model’s control and state variables. Although the magnitudes of the 
numerical solutions must be viewed with caution, their relative variations suggest that life 
protection plays a non-trivial role in explaining observed disparities.  
  To highlight some of our results: For our benchmark group (the entire US population), 
average  life  protection  ) t ( I is  projected  to  account  for  a  17.81%  reduction  in  the 
unobserved average level of “biological” mortality hazards ) t ( j  between ages 18-77. This 
may be a conservative estimate since our model abstracts from the utility value of lower 
morbidity  due  to  life  protection.  The  impact  on  life  expectancy  at  age  18  (6.155%) 
fluctuates within a range of 4.23% - 9.37%, or 2.355 – 5.218 years, if we allow for a 25% 
change in our basic parameters separately. These estimates are little affected if we allow for 
varying durability of life protection, which generally raises the incentive to engage in life 
protection at younger, relative to older ages, or if we introduce a balanced PAYG social 
security, which mainly delays the age at which VLS and life protection peak. 
  In terms of the relative impact of different determinants of life protection, which 
may also vary across different population groups, 1% lower unit cost of life protection or 
higher relative risk aversion raise life expectancy at age 18, by 1.4%, and higher rates of 
return on annuity savings delay significantly the age at which life protection peak. Life 
protection is estimated to add between 1.825 to 4.839 years of life expectancy at age 30 for 
high school graduates relative to those holding Doctorates, and net “human wealth” has a 
25% higher impact on life expectancy at 18 than non-human wealth. More significantly, 
our simulations explain 47% of documented differences in life expectancies of at age 30 
across males with high school vs. bachelor degrees.   30 
The  simulations  account  for  24%-33.3%  of  the  secular  growth  in  average  life 
expectancy at 20 over different periods ending in 1996, just on the basis of the secular 
growth in real labor earnings and its impact on human and non-human wealth. Based solely 
on the growth rate of real labor income (1.58%) observed in our sample, we project life 
expectancy at age 18 to reach 82.04, or 4.94 added years, by the year 2050. 
Our simulations highlight the existence of significant variations in imputed “values 
of life saving” (v*(t)) by age, by schooling levels, and over time. They also highlight a 
conceptual difference concerning alternative estimates of VLS, based on the time interval 
length  over  which  the  VLS  are  projected.  The  VLS  estimates  we  simulate  based  on 
compensating wage differentials for assuming higher risks of mortality over a one-year 
time interval (V*(t)), exhibit a relative age profile virtually identical to that of v*(t), but 
84% higher on average at all ages. They vary between $1.298 million for high-school 
males at age 75 and $5.965 million for males with Doctorates at age 40 in 1996 dollars.  
While our estimates of both v*(t) and V*(t) are likely to be understated, since they 
do not account for utility benefits life protection imparts through reduced morbidity, their 
range of variation appears to rationalize a good part of the huge disparities in private VLS 
estimates  obtained  via  regression  analyses  of  occupational  data.
20 Our  paper  offers  a 
theoretical methodology by which such age-specific disparities can be assessed.  
The feasibility and stability of our simulations open up opportunities for further 
extensions of our model to assess more fully the dynamic role of different means of life 
protection under different insurance setups, and to provide a more complete numerical 
analysis of the trends and diversities in life expectancies and values of life saving. We 
leave such extensions to future work.   31 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1     A  recent  exception  is  Goldman  and  Lakdawalla  (2001)  who  analyze  trends  in  the 
diversity of mortality risks by age and education, based on a static model of the demand for 
health. 
 
2  Viscusi and Aldy (2003) also emphasize the importance of recognizing variations in 
private VLS by age, but do not offer a formal model in this context.     
 
3  This specification of the output of life protection, I(t), measured in units of f(t), abstracts 
from  any  dependence  of  the  productivity  of  life-protective  inputs  on  the  scale  of  j(t) 
because the direction of such effect is not clear a-priori; any assumed non-neutrality would 
thus  be  arbitrary.  Also,  allowing  for  such  interaction  would  rule  out  the  derivation  of 
conditional closed-form solutions of the model, which greatly facilitate our simulations. 
We use an aggregate measure of I(t), and a corresponding cost function, on the implicit 
assumption that spending on specific inputs {mj, Mj} is allocated optimality to obtain the 
same marginal increase in I(t), or reduction in the hazard rate. Note that identifying M(t) as 
“preventive” care makes “remedial” care part of consumption, Z(t); the latter is conceived 
of as compulsory to prevent morbidity from becoming life threatening. 
 
4  As in deterministic models of health following Grossman (1972) and Ehrlich & Chuma 
(1990), we do not model education as endogenously determined with life protection. Since 
our simulations use age 18 or 25 as reference points, however, completed education may be 
viewed  as  predetermined.  In  our  simulations  we  relax  somewhat  this  “Ben-Porath 
neutrality” assumption by allowing for a range of deviations of c about its “neutral” level.   
 
5  However, these cross-sectional data do not allow for any adjustments to mortality data 
due to “cohort effects”. 
 
6  This estimate is based on the assumed cost function of life protection in equation (A.2), 
setting the parameter a=2, and estimates of actual spending on life protection from all 
sources, discussed below. The actual cost parameter used in the simulations is 3.4x10
8. 
This parameter implies that the cost of a “one-unit” reduction in I(t), hence in the mortality 
rate from its biological level (0.01 or 11% of the average fatality rate over the life cycle) is 
34,000 dollars.  
 
7  We  have  arrived  at  this  figure  as  follows:  after  smoothing  the  reported  medical 
expenditure for different ages (which are quite noisy) over 10-year intervals, we find the 
average annual medical care spending per person in the age interval 40-49 to be $1703.67 
in 1996, which is the year of our sample. The preventive care portion of total spending on 
each of the categories reported in the MEPS data was then arrived at adding all “primary 
care”, and 50% of all “secondary care”, spending totaling $788.22, or 46.27% of total 
medical  care  (We  are  indebted  to  Dr.  Michelle  Ehrlich  of  the  Cleveland  Clinic  for 
providing these preventive care assessments by categories of care.).  
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8  Our Harvey-based lower-bound OSHA annual cost estimate is $300 for 1996. Nachtrieb 
(2003)  bases  her  figures  on  NIH  studies.  The  annual  “diet”  costs,  including  food 
supplements, are extrapolated as $173.38 in 1996, and exercise costs are assessed to be 
approximately equal. These are lower-bound assessments of all “life-style” measures of life 
protection.  Adding these spending items to the preventive care figure produces a combined 
annual estimate of $1,434.98 for life protection spending. The projected total spending on 
life protection, based on the calibrated simulation for our benchmark group, is quite close: 
$1,433.32. We do not incorporate time costs involved in specific life protection activities 
since no reliable estimates exist, and our earnings estimate is confined to market earnings. 
   
9   Theoretically,  our  model  allows  for  variations  in  n(t)  over  the  life  cycle.  While 
preference for bequest may change in accordance with the individual’s marital or family 
status, any assumed changes in the life-cycle pattern of n(t) would be rather speculative in 
the context of the present formulation, which is why we set n to be constant. 
 
10  This figure is a conservative estimate of the real return on a total portfolio consisting of 
50% treasury bills, 25% government bonds, and 25% S&P 500 stocks over the 50-year 
period preceding 1996 where the corresponding yields were 1.33%, 2.14%, and 8.08%.  
Davies (1981) is using a similar real rate of return estimate. 
  
11  SAUS data for 1995 and 1998 imply that the median non-human wealth of a 65 years 
old family head is $343,197 in 1996 (using the annual growth rate of 14.09% for median 
wealth between 1995 and 1998). This produces a mean value of $473K on the assumption 
that  wealth,  like  earnings,  is  log-normally  distributed  with  a  median  of  $343K  and  a 
dispersion value of 0.8 (derived via a grid search that produces comparable values of the 
mean and the standard deviation of the wealth distribution.) In 1996 we also project the 
“social security wealth” of an average family head to be $175,698 at age 65. This estimate 
is obtained by discounting the annual benefit stream of $16,614 for a 65 years old recipient 
over the following 12 years (i.e., through life expectancy) at the reported 2% yield on social 
security taxes. The total mean wealth level thus computed is $659K, which is comparable 
to our model’s projection. Our projected mean wealth and social security wealth at age 65 
are quite close: $694.92 and $165.79K (see section IV.C.2). They are also close to those in 
Mitchell (2001), $625K and 174K, respectively.  
   
12  Note that life expectancy is less than proportionally related to survival risks, because of 
both the effect of discounting for survival, and the fixed planning horizon D. 
 
13  Our model assumes that annuities and life insurance are traded at actuarially fair terms. 
In reality, the existence of loading terms due to transaction costs implies that the premium 
charged on life insurance and borrowing becomes (1+g)f(t), while the risk premium paid 
on annuities becomes (1-g)f(t). No conditional closed-form solutions of our model exist in 
this case, which is why we do not attempt to impute the effect of loading in this paper. 
Ehrlich (2000, section 6) has shown, however, that while actuarially fair insurance markets 
produce higher VLS, hence life expectancies, compared to a world with no such markets,   35 
 
actuarially  unfair  insurance  markets  have  an  ambiguous  impact  on  these  variables, 
essentially because of conflicting effects on annuities and life insurance. 
14   The  value  of  c  has  been  calibrated  based  on  personal  outlays  on  preventive  life 
protection (see section III.C) and an assumed value of a. Consequently, when we vary a in 
this experiment, we also reconfigure the calibrated value of c to make the comparison 
relevant. 
   
15 For age groups beyond 80, where we do not have reported market earnings, we maintain 
the same 25% and 50% increments applied to the reported earnings at age 80.  
 
16  We conducted similar analyses to explain cross-group differences in life expectancies 
for  different  gender  and  racial  groups,  which  also  indicated  the  model’s  potential 
explanatory power. We do not report these results since the data available for calibrating 
these groups’ specific parameters are comparatively more limited. 
 
17  To the extent that persons with higher schooling are self-selected by virtue of their 
higher (endowed) survival probabilities, our assumed common j(t) density for all schooling 
groups  understates  our  projected  life  expectancies  especially  for  those  with  higher 
educational attainments.   
  
18  Data exigencies preclude an application of our model to explain also trends in the 
diversity of age-specific life expectancies of different population groups over time. 
  
19 Note that the mortality probability, p(t, t+￿) is by definition 1-S(t, t+￿), where  
￿
e +
- = e +
t
t ] du ) u ( f exp[ ) t , t ( S  by the Poisson law.  We can show that our time-interval 
estimate of VLS, V*(t; ￿) = ￿w*/￿p, evaluated over an interval length ￿, would approach a 
point estimate of VLS, dw*/dj [J(t) held constant] =  ] w / ) t ( J /[ ] j / ) t ( J [ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ - = v*(t) in 
equation (A.6), as  0 ® e .  While ￿w* is naturally approximated by (dw* e ´ ), however, a 
Taylor approximation of ￿p(t, t+￿) can be shown to always fall short of ￿j = ) dj ( e ´ , as 
long as ￿>0.  The reason is that dp(t, t+￿) measures a change in probability, not in a density 
function.  Thus V*(t; ￿)= ￿w*/￿p overstates v*(t)= ￿w*/￿j= (dw* e ´ )/ ) dj ( e ´ over any 
positive time interval ￿. Moreover, the difference between V*(t) and v*(t) is an increasing 
function of the interval length, ￿   
 
20  Viscusi (1993) survey reports the range of regression estimates applying the WTP 
approach using labor market data to be $0.6 million to $16.2 million. In contrast, the range 
of reported regression estimates using non-labor data is $.1 to $4 million.   
APPENDIX A 
1. Model specification 
The  formal  model  follows  Ehrlich  (2000,  section  5).    The  stochastic  probability  law 
governing the ‘force of mortality’, the definitions of the control and state variables, and 
the utility, ‘life-protection’ production, and cost functions are discussed in the text. The 
maximized expected utility function in this formulation is: 
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where D
~
 denotes the stochastic time of death, r an inter-temporal discount factor, and ￿ 
is vector of our model’s parameters, subject to wealth constraints: 
(A.2)  ) t ( A
0
 =  (r+f(t))A(t) + w(t)h(t) - cI
a(t) - Z(t) - f(t)B(t),  
(A.3)  0 £ B(t) £ A(t) + L(t) ³  0,  
and boundary conditions:   
(A.4)  J(A(D),D; ￿ ) = V(B
*(D),D) = V(A(D),D) and  A(D) ³0.  
In equation (A.2)-(A.4), A(t) denotes the current value of non-human wealth,  
}, du )] u ( B ) u ( f ) u ( Z ) u ( cI ) u ( wh ))[ u , 0 ( m ru ( exp ) 0 ( A { )) t , 0 ( m rt ( exp ) t ( A ) a 2 . A (
t
0 - - - - - + + =
a ￿
where  ￿ =
u
0 ds ) s ( f ) u , 0 ( m , w(t) = the wage rate, h(u) = healthy (labor) time, L(t) = net 
human wealth, i.e.,  
(A.3a) L(t) = ￿
D
t exp[-r(u-t)-m(t,u)][w(u)h(u)- cI
a(t)]du,  where m(t,u) º ￿
u
t , ds ) s ( f  
and D denotes the terminal date of the planning horizon that must be used to solve our 
stochastic dynamic program. Its determination is discussed in section III.E in the text. 
  By the stochastic dynamic programming approach, the solution must satisfy  
(A.5)  -Jt= - rJ + U(Z
*)+JA[(r+f)A+ w(t)h(t) - cI
a(t)  - Z
* - fB
*] + f[V(B
*,t) - J] , 
where Jt º ¶J(A(t),t; ￿)/¶t.   
The optimal control variables I
*, Z
*, and B
* are then solved from 
(A.6)  [acI(t)
a-1]
* =   A t J / ] f / J [ ¶ ¶  = (1/JA)[J(A(t),t; ￿)-V(B
*)]+B
*-A  º  v
*(t) 
(A.7)  UZ(Z
*) = JA 
(A.8)  B
* =  0  if JA > V' (B
*) 
    e ￿ ￿ (0, A(t)+L(t)),  if JA= V' (B
*)      
    A(t)+L(t),  if JA < V' (B
*), 
where (A.6) is also the solution for the shadow price of life protection, or VLS. 
 2. Conditional Explicit Solutions 
  No explicit solutions can be obtained for the system (A.6)-(A.8). To obtain a 
conditional closed-form solution for the maximized life-time expected utility function J1 
in equation (A.1), the instantaneous utility of consumption function is first specialized to 
exhibit ‘constant relative risk aversion’,  
(A.9)  U(Z) = (1/k)Z
k ,   
where 0<  k < 1 to assure concavity, and d = (1-k) denotes the degree of relative risk 
aversion.  The utility of bequest function is similarly specialized as 
(A.10)  V(B,t) = [n(t)/k]B
k , 
with n(t) representing the intensity of utility derived by the individual from capital to be 
bequeathed to heirs.  Finally, the optimal consumption and bequest choices are now taken 
to be conditional on a predetermined path of optimal self-protection outlays. 
  These simplifications permit an explicit solution for the partial differential 
equation (A.5), conditional on an optimal path of self-protection inputs (I), i.e., taking the  
age-specific density of mortality rates f(t) as given.. The solution can be shown equal to 
(A.11)  J(A(t),t;a) = [a(t)/k][A(t) + L(t)]
k . 
where a(t) represents the marginal expected utility of a unit of wealth while one is alive. 
It s solution is given by  
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where  x(u) º f(u) + [(r-rk)/(1-k)], and y(u) º 1+f(u)[n(u)]
(1/d). 
  Equations (A.11) and (A.12) provide an explicit solution for the indirect expected 
utility of the remaining life span, conditional on optimal self-protection inputs (I*(t)). By 
exploiting equations (A.6), (A.7), (A.8), and (A.11), we can obtain similarly conditional 
explicit solutions for the co-state variable v
*(t), or the value-of-life-saving function, and 
the optimal values of consumption and bequest as follows: 
(A.13) v
*(t) =  (1/k)L(t)+[(1-k)/k][A(t)-B
*(t)] = z(t)[A(t) + L(t)]-A(t) = acI*(t)
a-1 
where  z(t) = [n(t)/a(t)]
(1/d) + (1/k){1-[n(t)/a(t)]
(1/d)} >1 (see Ehrlich 2000, p.357) 
(A.14) Z
*(t) = [1/a(t)]
(1/d)[A(t) + L(t)],  and 
(A.15) B
*(t) = [n(t)/a(t)]
(1/d)[A(t) + L(t)]. 
  Equation (A.13) indicates the greater importance of human (L(t)), relative to non-
human (A(t)) wealth in affecting the value of life saving. For a detailed interpretation of 
this result see Ehrlich (op. cit.). 
3.  Unconditional Solutions 
  Using the explicit solutions (A.13)–(A.15) and the first order condition for the 
optimal self-protection (A.6), an unconditional solution to all three control variables of 
the model, and thus for the model’s co-state and state variables as well, can be found 
through the iterative procedure described in the text and in Appendix B.    
APPENDIX B 
The iteration procedure we use is similar to Newton’s method, except that we do not use 
the  system’s  Jacobian  matrix  to  enhance  the  convergence  speed.  All  the  relevant 
numerical integrations are carried out using the Simpson method. The iterations involve 
the following steps: 
 
·  Step A: Initialize a path of life-protection efforts, I(t).  In the benchmark case proceed 
to step B.  In our calibrated simulations we use the initialized I(t) to construct f(t) 
from  previously  projected  j(t),  subject  to  f(t)￿0,  and  then  proceed  to  obtain 
dt ) t ( f ) j , i ( m
j
i￿ º  through numerical integration.   
·   Step  B:  Calculate  by  numerical  integration  the  factor  a(t)  –  a  component  of  the 
intensity of the optimal value function (A.11) - using its definition in eq. (A.12) of 
Appendix A.  This calculation is done on the basis of the computed values of f(t) and 
m(i,j),  and  subject  to  our  calibrated  values  for  the  other  basic  parameters  of  the 
model: the real rate of  interest, r, the rate of time preference,  r, the intensity of 
bequest preference, n, and the degree of relative risk aversion, 1-k.    
 
·  Step  C:  Calculate  financial  wealth  A(t),  bequest  B(t),  consumption  Z(t),  and  net 
human wealth L(t) (the discounted labor income net of the cost of self-protection) as 
follows: 
C1: Given I(t) and f(t), calculate L(t) by numerical integration using equation (A.3a) 
in Appendix A. 
C2: Calculate Z(t) and B(t). As in Ehrlich (2000) equation (3.7a), Z(t) has a growth 
rate of  (r-r)/(1-k), and from (A.14), Z(0) can be determined by A(0), a(0), and L(0).  
B(t) can be similarly calculated, given the assumed value of the intensity of bequest 
preferences , since by equations (A.14) and (A.15) B(t) = n(t)
1/(1-k) Z(t). 
C3: Given the solutions to Z(t),  L(t) and a(t), we can use (A.14) to solve for A(t).   
 
·  Step D:  Calculate the value of life saving v*(t), thus life-protection expenditures I(t), 
as given in equation (A.13), using A(t), B(t), and L(t) from the previous step. 
 
·  Step E:  Compare I(t), as calculated in Step D, with the preceding path of I(t).  (In the 
first round, the “preceding path” is the initialized path).  Define diff = Max t [|I(t) - 
I
0(t)|  /  I
0(t)],  where  I
0(t)  is  the  preceding  path  of  I(t),  i.e.,  diff  is  the  maximum 
percentage change in I(t).  If diff < tol, where tol is some pre-specified tolerance 
level, the system converges, and you may report the results.  If diff > tol, record the 
current new I(t) as the previous path of I(t) and proceed to Step C. The tolerance level 
we have chosen for tol is 10
-5. 
  
Table 1:  Calibrated Simulations of Life-Protection Choices in our Baseline Case 
(1996 data) Conditional on survival to: 
 
Age 18  Peak of v*(t)  Age 65  Actual life expectancy at 18 
  Age  Value of 
v*(t) 
  Age  Value of other 
variables 
1a. Remaining Actual Life Expectancy T
*(t)
# 
59.08      17.58     
1b. Net Human Wealth L(t) (in $K)*
 
610.27  38  653.52  234.21  77  43.37 
1c. Non-Human Wealth A(t) (in $K)* 
6.50  38  172.80  694.92  77  793.41 
1d. Value of Life Saving v*(t) (in $M)*
 
1.191  38  1.435  1.090  77  0.775 
1e. Expenditure on Life Protection C(t) (in $ mil.)  
1043.1  38  1514.1  873.1  77  441.9 
1f. Observed Mortality Hazard Rates f(t) 
0.0009  38  0.0019  0.0166  77  0.0445 
1g. Imputed “Biological” Mortality Hazard rates j(t) 
0.0026  38  0.0040  0.0182  77  0.0457 
1h. Impact of Life Protection on “Biological” Life Expectancy (years) 
3.426  38  1.614  0.249  77  0.065 
1i. Impact of Life Protection on “Biological” Life Expectancy (%) 
6.155  38  4.172  1.435  77  0.656 
Basic parameter set: k = 0.5, r = 3.2%, r = 1.5%, n = 1.2, a=2, and c = 3.4. 
*
  Life Expectancy T*(t), the actuarially fair values of net human wealth L(t), non-human 
wealth A(t), and value of life saving v*(t) are defined in Appendix A. Monetary values 
are in 1996 dollars 
#  Remaining actual life expectancy for the benchmark group. 
  
Table 2:  Life Protection’s Impact on Life Expectancy and Value of Life Saving 
(in 1996 million $). Role of Parameter Changes 
    Impact on Life Expectancy at 18  Value of Life Saving at 
Parameter  Range  Percentage  Years  Peak Age  Peak Value 
  0.375  7.939  4.419  38  1.823 
k  0.5*  6.155  3.426  38  1.435 
  0.625  5.060  2.817  38  1.186 
 
  2.55  8.300  4.621  38  1.432 
c  3.4*  6.155  3.426  38  1.435 
  4.25  4.890  2.722  38  1.437 
 
  1.5  4.230  2.355  38  1.424 
a  2.0*  6.155  3.426  38  1.435 
  2.5  8.015  4.462  38  1.448 
 
  2.4%  6.242  3.475  28  1.534 
r  3.2%*  6.155  3.426  38  1.435 
  4.0%  6.302  3.508  55  1.523 
 
  0.9  6.174  3.437  38  1.439 
n  1.2*  6.155  3.426  38  1.435 
  1.5  6.131  3.413  37  1.430 
 
  $26,658*  6.155  3.426  38  1.435 
w(t)**  +25%  7.750  4.314  38  1.789 
  +50%  9.373  5.218  38  2.141 
 
  $6,315#  6.155  3.426  38  1.435 
A(0)***  +25%  6.163  3.431  38  1.437 
  +50%  6.172  3.436  38  1.439 
 
  -25%  6.691  3.966  39  1.485 
j(t)  Original*  6.155  3.426  38  1.435 
  +25%  5.707  3.003  37  1.391 
*     Denotes our selected benchmark parameter and initial conditions. 
**   Upward adjustments of 25% and 50% are meant to capture alternative “full earnings”   
        levels, adjusted for home production.  
*** Upward adjustments designed to be comparable to those for w(t).  
#      A(0) in the benchmark case is imputed from the bequest choices of the previous  
        generation (see text).   
Table 3:  Calibrated Simulations of Life-time Choices in our Benchmark Case 
Additional Sensitivity Analysis 
At Age:  18  Peak of v
*(t)  65  Actual life expectancy at 
18: 
Change    Age  Value of v*(t)     Age  Value of other 
variables  
A. Approximating the impact of higher (lower) durability of life protection I(t) by 
letting I(39) lower (raise) mortality risks by 25% over 10 years (ages 40-50) 
3A.1 Remaining Projected Life Expectancy 
0*  59.08      17.58     
-25%  59.44      17.58     
-25%(10%)#  59.27      17.58     
+25%  58.72      17.58     
+25%(10%)#  58.88      17.58     
 
3A.2 Value of Life Saving (in $M) 
0*  1.191  38  1.435  1.090  77  0.775 
-25%  1.197  38  1.448  1.088  78  0.743 
-25% (10%)#  1.194  38  1.442  1.089  77  0.774 
+25%  1.185  37  1.423  1.092  77  0.777 
+25%(10%)#  1.188  38  1.428  1.091  77  0.776 
 
3A.3 Expenditure on Life Protection 
0*  1043.1  38  1514.1  873.1  77  441.9 
-25%  1053.3  38  1540.7  870.2  78  405.8 
-25%(10%)#  1048.9  38  1529.0  871.7  77  441.0 
+25%  1033.0  37  1488.1  876.1  77  443.7 
+25%(10%)#  1037.3  38  1499.4  874.5  77  442.7 
 
B. Simulations adjusted to reflect the role of PAYG Social Security 
3B.1 Projected Remaining Life Expectancy 
Unadjusted*  59.10      17.58     
Adjusted**  59.14      17.60     
 
3B.2 Value of Life Saving (in $M) 
Unadjusted*  1.191  38  1.435  1.090  77  0.775 
Adjusted**  1.173  40  1.442  1.228  77  0.805 
 
3B.3 Expenditure on Life Protection 
Unadjusted*  1043.1  38  1514.1  873.1  77  441.9 
Adjusted**  1011.4  40  1528.8  1109.1  77  477.0 
Basic parameter set: r=3.2%, r=1.5%, n=1.2, and c=3.4. Monetary values are in 1996$ 
# Assuming a straight-line depreciation of the durability impact 
* The unadjusted values are the simulated values for our benchmark case in Table 1 
** Simulations adjusted after imposing social security taxes and benefits  
Table 4:  Calibrated Simulations of Lifetime Choices by 
Education (1996 data), Using Imputed Biological Mortalities of Benchmark Group* 
At Age:  30  Peak of v
*(t)  65  Life Expectancy at 25  
Education    Age  Value of 
v*(t) 
  Age  Value of other 
variables  
4a. Remaining Projected Life Expectancy using Benchmark Biological Risks
** 
High School  44.41      15.71     
Bachelor  45.84      15.84     
Master  46.51      15.91     
Doctorate  47.42      15.99     
 
4b. Value of Life Saving (in $M) 
High School  1.256  37  1.282  0.955  74  0.743 
Bachelor  2.183  38  2.245  1.651  76  1.178 
Master  2.651  36  2.689  1.984  76  1.448 
Doctorate  3.098  40  3.228  2.485  78  1.577 
 
4c. Impact of Life Protection on Life Expectancy (years) 
High School  1.825  37  1.335  0.180  74  0.066 
Bachelor  3.256  38  2.258  0.311  76  0.087 
Master  3.932  36  2.998  0.379  76  0.107 
Doctorate  4.839  40  3.041  0.467  78  0.095 
 
4d. Impact of Life Protection on Life Expectancy (%) 
High School  4.286  37  3.621  1.158  74  0.639 
Bachelor  7.646  38  6.265  2.001  76  0.947 
Master  9.235  36  7.956  2.441  76  1.164 
Doctorate  11.364  40  8.835  3.007  78  1.153 
 
4e. Estimated Remaining Life Expectancies Based on Death Certificates Data  
(RB 1990)** 
High School  44.4      15.5     
Some College  44.9      15.6     
Bachelor  47.4      16.6     
More Than 
Bachelor 
49.1      17.9     
*   See notes to Table 1. The benchmark group here is all US males. All monetary values 
are in 1996 dollars. 
** Estimated life expectancies in RB, thus in our simulations, are for males.  
Table 5.  Trends in Life Expectancy at Age 20* (through 1996)
 
  Year 
  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
Remaining Life Expectancy 
Projected
1  56.10  56.35  56.60  56.82  57.04 
Projected
2  55.60  55.89  56.20  56.51  56.86 
Actual  53.00  53.9  55.46  56.1  56.63 
 
Increase in Life Expectancy from Selected Year to 1996 
Projected
1  1.07  0.82  0.57  0.35  0.13 
Projected
2  1.57  1.28  0.97  0.66  0.31 




1  25.66  25.08  33.33  32.71  24.07 
Projected
2  37.65  39.14  56.73  61.68  57.41 
 
*  Backward  projections  based  on  imputed  “biological”  mortality  rates  in  1996. 
Projections shown at age 20, to make them comparable to actually reported age-specific 
life expectancies in VS publications. The Basic parameter set is the same as in Table 1. 
1 Based on reported labor earnings for the general population. 
2 Given a 1% rate of reduction in the real unit cost of life protection, c (based on a 1% 
economy-wide TFP growth rate) in addition to actual earnings growth.     
          
 
Table 6: Age-Specific VLS based on Willingness to Accept Compensating Wage 
Differentials for Marginally Higher Mortality Risks Over One-Year Intervals 
(V*(t)) vs. “Point” Estimates based Willingness to Spend on Life Protection (v*(t)) 
 
Age  20  25  30  35  36  37  38  39 
v*(t) (in $M)  1.2399  1.3369  1.3991  1.4303  1.4330  1.4345  1.4350  1.434 
V*(t) (in $M)  2.3647  2.5586  2.6451  2.6722  2.6722  2.6740  2.6782  2.653 
Age  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75 
v*(t) (in $M)  1.4325  1.4078  1.3578  1.2859  1.194  1.090  0.968  0.834 
V*(t) (in $M)  2.6472  2.5832  2.4722  2.2966  2.155  1.972  1.756  1.504 
 
The v*(t) estimates are derived from the simulations reported in Table 1 for detailed ages. 
V*(t) are derived by raising the mortality probability over a one-year period by 0.1 per 
1000 and estimating the compensating wage differential (in 1996 dollars) required to 
keep lifetime expected utility at age 18 intact for our benchmark group.  













Figure 2: Calibrated Simulations of Benchmark Case: Net Human Wealth 














Figure 3: Calibrated Simulations of Benchmark Case: Non-Human Wealth 
















Figure 4: Calibrated Simulations (using Alternative Interest Rates):
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Figure 6: Calibrated Simulations of Benchmark Case: Life Expectancy based on 
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